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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals (1987)
provides:
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding
challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant
intents to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) provides in
pertinent part:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.

v.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State charged Ms. Jiminez with assault by a prisoner,
a third degree felony.

The trial court dismissed the charge based

on defendant's motion.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26(c)(1) (1953 as amended)
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).

vi.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Should the decision of the trial court to dismiss the
charge of Assault by a Prisoner based on the State's failure to
preserve a videotape of the incident be affirmed on appeal?

vii.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

JESSIE JIMINEZ,

:

Case No. 870399-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the State from an Order of Dismissal
of a charge of Assault by a Prisoner, a Third Degree Felony, Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1953 as amended), entered on September 9,
1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G, Noel, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 14, 1987, Jessie Jiminez was arrested on the
charge of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and transported to
the Salt Lake County Jail by police officers (R. 15-17).

The State

alleged that during the booking process, Ms. Jiminez assaulted the
arresting officer by attempting to kick him in the stomach (R. 16,
17, 35).
A preliminary hearing on the charge of assault by a
prisoner was held in circuit court on June 11, 1987 (R. 04)

Shortly

thereafter, on July 2, 1987, defense counsel filed a motion to
compel further discovery, requesting that the court order the state
to provide Ms. Jiminez with

ff

[a]ny video tapes taken of the alleged

incident" (R. 21). A minute entry dated July 31, 1987, shows that a
prosecutor other than the prosecutor assigned to the case appeared
and informed the Court that the state did not have a video (R. 24).
Thereafter, on August 7, 1987, the State responded in writing to Ms.
Jiminez1 request for additional discovery, stating in pertinent part:
The video tape of all bookings, including this
incident was recycled after approximately 72 hours.
This is a normal procedure used at the Salt Lake
County Jail. The tape of the incident was erased
because no request was made to retain the tape and
absent such a request the tape is always recycled.
The tape was not intentionally erased or destroyed.
(R. 28, See Addendum A ) .
On August 13, 1987, Ms. Jiminez, by and through counsel,
filed a Memorandum in support of her Motion to Dismiss the charge of
Assault on a police officer (R. 35-38).

The state responded in a

Memorandum filed August 19, 1987 and stated, for the first time in
the record before the Court, that it was "uncertain whether or not
the incident was in fact videotaped by the equipment that was
operating at the Salt Lake County Jail" (R. 32).
After a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss for failure to
preserve evidence held on August 21, 1987, the Honorable Frank G.
Noel ordered:
that the charge of Assault by a Prisoner . . . is
dismissed for the reason that the state failed to
retain any videotape of the incident at the Salt
Lake County Jail . . .
(R. 40-41, See Addendum B) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The record before this Court establishes that the trial
court had ample evidence to support a finding that a videotape of
- 2

-

the incident was taken and later destroyed.

Destruction of the

videotape violated Ms. Jiminez' due process rights under the Utah
and United States Constitutions since the videotape would have been
dispositive of the issue whether Ms. Jiminez committed the crime of
Assault by a Prisoner, and the videotape was therefore material to
the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT:

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS
THE CHARGE OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER BASED
ON THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL.
A.

THE FINDING OF FACT BY THE TRIAL COURT
THAT A VIDEOTAPE OF THE INCIDENT EXISTED
WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

The findings and conclusions of the trial court will not
be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule
52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; State v. DePlonty, 73 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16 (December 31, 1987).
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987)
provides in pertinent part:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
Rule 52(a) applies in criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-26(g) (1953 as amended) and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 81(e) (1953 as amended).

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192

(Utah 1987).
This Court has acknowledged that the Court of
Appeals presumes the findings of fact of the trial
court to be correct.
- 3 -

It is not our function to make findings of fact
because this Court does not have the advantage of
seeing and hearing witnesses testify. On review,
this Court views the evidence and all the inferences
that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light
most supportive of the trial court's findings.
Unless clearly erroneous, findings of fact will not
be set aside. . . . Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d
461 (1987) (citations and quotations omitted).
In the present case, after holding a hearing on the
motion and reviewing Memoranda submitted by both parties, the trial
judge ordered that the charge of Assault by a Prisoner be dismissed.
ff

[F]or the reason that the State failed to retain
any videotape of the incident at the Salt Lake
County Jail involving the defendant . . ."
(R. 41, See Addendum B ) .
Implicit in this order is a finding that a videotape of the alleged
assault existed at one time and was later destroyed.
Based on the record before this Court, the trial court
had ample evidence to find that a videotape of the incident existed,
and that finding should therefore not be disturbed on appeal. The
record supplied by the state establishes that on July 2, 1987,
shortly after the preliminary hearing, defense counsel filed a
motion to compel further discovery wherein he specifically requested
that he be provided with a copy of any videotape of the incident
(R. 21). The first indication in the record of response by the
State shows up in a minute entry dated July 31, 1987, where a
substitute prosecutor informed the Court that the State did not have
a videotape (R. 24). This minute entry supports the Court's finding
that the tape was destroyed and offers no probative information as
to whether a tape was in fact made.

- 4
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On August 7, 1987, the State responded in writing to Ms.
Jiminez1 motion to compel further discovery, stating in part:
The video tape of all bookings, including this
incident was recycled after approximately 72 hours.
This is a normal procedure used at the Salt Lake
County Jail. The tape of the incident was erased
because no request was made to retain the tape and
absent such a request the tape is always recycled.
The tape was not intentionally erased or destroyed.
(R. 28/ See Addendum A.) (emphasis added)
This response acknowledges that a videotape of the alleged incident
had been taken, but claims that it was inadvertently destroyed.
This statement offers the trial court ample evidence by which it
could find that a videotape of the incident had been made.
Furthermore, it clarifies that the prior July 31, 1987 minute entry
reflected a statement by the substitute prosecutor that the tape no
longer existed, not that it had never been made.
Only after Ms. Jiminez filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Preserve Evidence, and a Memorandum in support thereof,
did the State begin to question the existence of the videotape.
(R. 32)

In its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss, the prosecutor stated:
Plaintiff, State of Utah, is largely in agreement
with the facts as stated by the defendant in her
motion to dismiss, except it remains uncertain
whether or not the incident was in fact videotaped
by the equipment that was operating at the Salt Lake
County Jail.
(R. 32). The statement that "it remains uncertain whether a
videotape of the incident was made" is the first indication of any
such uncertainty in the record, and is far less adamant than the
position currently taken on appeal that the "state disputed whether
- 5
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the incident was captured by the video equipment"

(See Appellant's

Opening Brief at 3 ) . Based on the information in the record, in
particular the prosecutorfs acknowledgement in his response to the
Motion to Compel Further Discovery that a tape had existed but was
erased, the trial court had ample evidence to support its finding
that a tape of the incident had been made and later destroyed.
The state argues on appeal that Ms. Jiminez did not offer
evidence to show that a videotape of the incident existed or that
anyone had viewed it to determine whether the alleged kick was in
fact filmed.

In light of the prosecutor's concession that a

videotape of the incident was made but later erased (R. 28) such an
argument is fallacious.

Furthermore, the state failed to request

the preparation of a transcript of the proceedings and, as a result,
cannot now argue that certain evidence is missing from the record.
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
(1987) provides:
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding
challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion. (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed the need
for appellant to present the entire record when urging that a
conclusion below is not supported by the record.
In [reviewing factual findings], we examine all the
record evidence, giving "great weight to the
findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial
judge" and setting them aside under Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a) only if "clearly erroneous." State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 2585 (1971)).
- 6
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Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987).
The record before this Court establishes that the
implicit finding of the trial court that a videotape of the incident
was made and later destroyed is not clearly erroneous. The State
conceded that a tape of the incident was made, but later erased and
cannot now argue with any force, based on an incomplete record, that
the trial court erred in making such a finding.
B.

THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE VIDEOTAPE
OF THE INCIDENT DENIED MS. JIMINEZ DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
guarantee an accused due process of law.

Due process is violated

where the state fails to preserve evidence which is material to an
accused's guilt or innocence.
1975).

State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah

See also State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985).

"The

intent or purpose of the prosecution in destroying the evidence is
irrelevant.11

State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986).

Furthermore, destruction of evidence by police is chargeable to the
prosecutor.
1974).

Seattle v. Fettig, 519 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wash. App.

See also Stewart at 479 ("destruction of evidence by those

charged with the prosecution including police officers constitutes a
violation of due process if the evidence is material to guilt or
innocence of the defendant in a criminal case (emphasis added)).
In determining whether evidence which was destroyed was
vital or material so as to constitute a due process violation, the
Utah Supreme Court has explained that more than evidentiary
- 7
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materiality is required; the evidence must be "material in
constitutional sense."
1983).

State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah

The Utah Supreme Court defined constitutional materiality in

State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985):
Constitutional materiality requires that there be a
showing that the suppressed or destroyed evidence is
vital to the issues of whether the defendant is
guilty of the charge and whether there is a
fundamental unfairness that requires the Court to
set aside the defendant's conviction.
In Lovato, the Utah Supreme Court further explained that
evidence is material "in the constitutional sense" where there is
more than a "mere possibility". . . that the evidence "might have
affected the outcome of the trial."

See Lovato at 1305.

The videotape in the instant case was "material in the
constitutional sense" because it would show directly whether Ms.
Jiminez kicked the officer and therefore would not only affect the
outcome, but would be dispositive of the question of whether
Ms. Jiminez was guilty of the crime charged.
In People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1976), the
Colorado Court of Appeals found a denial of due process in a factual
situation substantially similar to the instant case.

In Harmes, the

state alleged that the defendant intentionally kicked a police
officer after having been taken to the jail on another charge.
Defense counsel requested that a videotape which had been taken of
the incident be provided.

The tape had been destroyed in the

interim, and the defendant moved for a dismissal.

The trial court

denied the motion, but the Court of appeals found a due process
violation and reversed.

The Harmes court stated:
- 8
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The materiality of the destroyed videotape cannot be
questioned. Had it been preserved, it likely would
have conclusively established defendant's innocence
or guilt. . . . [T]he people urge that defendant's
inability to demonstrate that the videotape was
favorable to the defense thus defeats his claim of
denial of due process. They also contend that the
testimony of the arresting officers that the film
supported their account of the incident, coupled
with the proffered testimony of another officer who
purportedly viewed the film, was sufficient to
establish its inculpatory character. We do not
agree.
Where, as here, crucial material evidence is
wholly destroyed by the prosecution, and the
responsibility for such destruction cannot properly
be imputed to the defense, any requirement that
defendant somehow demonstrate that the evidence was
exculpatory becomes an absurdity, and is not
imposed. . . .
An assertion by the very agency responsible for
the negligent or otherwise destruction of evidence
regarding its alleged content, especially where the
destroyed evidence pertained to an offense allegedly
perpetrated against a member of that agency, is
insufficient to cure the damage resulting from
defendant having been deprived of its use in the
preparation of his defense.
Harmes at 474 (citations omitted).

See also Seattle v. Fettig, 519

P.2d 1002 (Wash. App. 1974); State v. Boyd, 629 P.2d 930 (Wash.
1981); Farrell v. State, 317 So.2d 142 (Fla. App. 1978).
As the Harmes Court pointed out, requiring a defendant to
establish that evidence held and subsequently destroyed by the
prosecution was exculpatory is an "absurdity" since a defendant
without possession of the destroyed videotape would be incapable of
ever establishing its content.

Harmes at 474.

In its opening brief at 7, the State attempted to
distinguish Harmes by arguing that in that case "at the preliminary
hearing, defense counsel was told that the tape would be preserved
and presented as evidence against Harmes. . . and that "[t]he
- 9
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Colorado Supreme Court [sic] reversed Harmes1 conviction stating
that the tape was known to be material and critical, and not merely
incidental to the question of Harmes1 guilt or innocence[.]"
(citations omitted).
A review of the facts in the instant case shows that the
Statefs "distinction" is meaningless.

While counsel for Harmes was

told at the preliminary hearing that a tape existed and would be
held by police, in the instant case, the prosecutor conceded in his
response to the Motion to Compel Discovery that a tape of the
incident had existed (R. 28). In addition, since a transcript of
the proceedings was not prepared, the fact that defense counsel was
informed at the preliminary hearing that a videotape of the incident
existed is not apparent in the record before this court.1
Implicit in its order in the instant case, the trial
court not only made a finding of fact that a videotape of the
alleged incident was made and later destroyed (See discussion infra
at 3-7), but also a conclusion that the videotape was "material in a
constitutional sense."

Such a conclusion can be disturbed on appeal

only upon a determination by this Court that the conclusion was
clearly erroneous.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; State

v. DePlonty.

1

However, the filing of the motion to compel further discovery
following the preliminary hearing suggests that the state had
supplied defense counsel with information at the preliminary hearing
that a videotape of the incident existed.
- 10 -

The state argues that Ms. Jiminez did not establish that
the tape was material by failing to establish that anyone viewed the
tape before it was erased and therefore

ff

no one knows what was on

the tape, if anything, that was relevant to defendant's defense".
Appellantfs Opening Brief at 5.
three reasons.

Such a statement is fallacious for

First, as previously outlined, the incident was

allegedly comprised of a single kick in the booking area, and the
prosecutor acknowledged that a videotape of the incident had been
made (R. 28). The prosecutor's concession obviates the need for
establishing through other evidence that the incident was filmed.
Second, the Court's ruling makes an implicit finding that
the incident was filmed and the videotape was "material in a
constitutional sense," and the State has failed to offer anything in
the record which would establish that the trial court's decision was
erroneous.

The Harmes Court stated that the testimony of the

officers involved in the incident that the film confirmed their
version of the incident was not sufficient "to cure the damage
resulting from defendant having been deprived of its use in the
preparation of his defense."

Harmes at 474. The evidence in the

instant case did not rise to the level of that in Harmes since the
state did not offer testimony that the videotape was inculpatory and
fails to suggest any evidentiary basis for a determination that the
decision of the trial court was erroneous.
Finally, as the Harmes Court pointed out, a defendant
without access to the evidence would never be able to establish the
exact content of a videotape and to require him to do so "becomes an
absurdity".

Harmes at 474. Ms. Jiminez, or any other person
- 11 -

accused of assaulting a police officer is incapable of establishing
the content of a videotape of the alleged incident where the officer
or the agency for which he works has possession of the videotape and
destroys it, negligently or otherwise.

The State's argument in the

instant case that Ms. Jiminez failed to establish that someone
viewed the tape and failed to establish that the tape was
exculpatory is precisely the type of "absurdity" focused on by the
Harmes Court.
In addition, requiring Ms. Jiminez to defend herself
without the tape, the most accurate and unbiased evidence of the
event, would be fundamentally unfair.

The only evidence supporting

the charge was the testimony of police officers.

As the United

States Supreme Court has recognized, police officers are "engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" which may
cause their actions or testimony to be more subjective in nature.
See generally, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Where an officer is the alleged victim of the crime, the bias and
subjectivity of the officers' testimony is likely to increase.
Hence, the videotape is material under both of the definitions set
forth in Lovato:

the tape is vital to the issues and requiring

Ms. Jiminez to proceed without it would be fundamentally unfair.
In the decisions by the Utah Supreme Court where that
Court has found that destroyed evidence was not material, evidence
other than the officer's testimony supporting the charge existed,
and the evidence which was destroyed was merely cumulative.

In

State v. Stewart, the actual marijuana purchased by the officer was
introduced into evidence and therefore evidence supporting the
- 12 -

charge other than the officers' testimony existed and the
destruction of the tape recording did not violate the defendant's
due process rights.

In Nebeker, the destruction of a photo array in

which the defendant's photograph did not appear was tangential and
cumulative to the case and therefore did not amount to a due process
violation,

in Lovato, the destruction of a knife did not violate

due process because its existence was not disputed, the description
of the knife was detailed and the defense argued that no knife was
used, not that the particular knife was not used,

in addition, the

defendant in Lovato was unable to demonstrate a fundamental
unfairness resulting from the destruction of the knife.
Finally, in Shaffer the Utah Supreme Court held that the
destruction of the victim's body after the state medical examiner
performed an autopsy and determined that the cause of death was
homicide did not violate due process since potential evidence of
gunshot residue on the victim's hands would not have been vital to
the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant.

In Shaffer,

there was evidence from the medical examiner and police officers
that in their opinion the cause of death was homicide.

The medical

examiner testified that even if the hands of the victim showed
gunshot residue, his opinion as to cause of death would be the
same.

Hence, the Court determined in Shaffer that the test for

gunshot residue was insignificant to the case.
Cases cited by the state in its opening brief at 5 are
similarly distinguishable.

None of the cases involved a videotape

of the entire incident, and evidence other than the testimony of a
- 13 -

victim officer existed.

In People v. Roblas, 568 P.2d 57 (Colo.

1977), the audio tape which was destroyed contained an interview of
one of the defendants (who became a key prosecution witness) in a
homicide case, and unlike the present case, did not record the
entire incident.

Five witnesses to the taped interview, as well as

the prosecution's key witness (who was the subject of the interview)
were willing to testify to the details of the initial interview and
the change in stories by the prosecution witness to a version which
was less favorable to the defendants.

Because the audiotape

contained only an interview of a witness and numerous witnesses were
able to reconstruct the details of that interview, and because
additional evidence supporting the charge of homicide against the
defendant existed, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision and allowed the prosecution witness to testify even
though the tape of his initial interview was destroyed.
In People v. Holloway, 649 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1982), also
cited by the State in its opening brief, the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the defendant's due process rights were violated where the
description of an alleged burglar was broadcast by officers and the
police dispatch tapes of that broadcast were subsequently
destroyed.

The state's reliance on Holloway in support of the

statement that "[w]here there are eyewitnesses who are available and
would be subject to cross-examination, destruction of a possibly
corroborative tape does not attain constitutional dimensions"
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 5) is therefore incorrect.

The

Holloway Court reversed the decision of the trial court because
although the destruction of the tape violated due process, the
- 14 -

defendant was not prejudiced because persons who overheard the
broadcast were available to testify and the officer who had seen the
burglar could "be fully examined as to his opportunity to view the
burglar and the accuracy of his broadcast description (citations
omitted)11

Holloway at 320. The dispatch tape was merely cumulative

evidence, and did not encompass the entire incident as did the
videotape in the instant case.
Unlike any of the cases cited by Appellant other than
Harmes, the destroyed videotape in the instant case captured the
entire incident (R. 28) and would have been dispositive of the issue
as to whether Ms. Jiminez assaulted the officer.

The video tape was

therefore material, and its destruction deprived Ms. Jiminez of due
process of law as guaranteed by the Utah and United States
Constitutions, resulting in prejudice to her since she was unable to
adequately prepare her defense and left with the subjective
testimony of officers with an interest in the outcome as the only
evidence against her.

The state has presented no evidence in the

record to show that decision of the trial court that the videotape
was material in a constitutional sense and resulted in prejudice to
Ms. Jiminez, thereby requiring dismissal was clearly erroneous;
therefore, the decision of the trial court must be upheld on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Jiminez, by and through
counsel, requests this court to affirm the trial court's order of
dismissal.
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DATED this

II

day of March, 1988.

JAflES C. BRADSHAW
^^
:torney for Appellant

<rtto- <• uhzf
JOAN C .

WATT

Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this

II

day of March, 1988.

DELIVERED by

this

March, 1988.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ERNIE JONES
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATEfS ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR 87-777

v.
JESSIE JIMENEZ,

Honorable Frank G. Noel
Defendant,
Comes now the Plaintiff by and thru Ernie Jones, Deputy
County Attorney and answers the Defendant's discovery as follows:
1.
incident

was

The

video

recycled

tape

after

of

all

bookings,

approximately

72

including

hours.

normal procedure used at the Salt Lake County Jail.

This
The

this
is a

tape of

the incident was erased because no request was made to retain the
tape and absent

such a request

the tape is always

recycled.

The

tape was not intentionally erased or destroyed.
2.

Plaintiff is not aware of any investigation conducted

by Salt Lake City Police Department Internal Affairs Division into

States Answers to Defendant's
Motion for Additional Discovery
CR 87-777
Page 2
alleged physical abuse of citizens by Officer Michael Beesley,
DATED this 7th day of August, 1987.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

'/f/f?^

\/:^XJL^

INIE JONES
Deputy County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 7th day of August, 1987, I
mailed

a true and correct copy of the foregoing States Answer to

Defendant's Motion for Additional Discovery

to James

Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated below.

:retary O
Secretary
JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for the Defendant
Legal Defender Association
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

cjb

C. Bradshaw,
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«;-•; Lr-Ks County, uts*

c-:p - 9 1987
DAVID E. YOCOM
^ •
Salt Lake County Attorney
s'p';
ERNIE JONES
L ***" /
Deputy County Attorney
~
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CR 87-777

JESSIE JIMENEZ, -Q^
Honorable Frank G. Noel
Defendant.
The defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve
evidence came on for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on
the

21st day of August,

1987. The defendant

was present and

represented by James Bradshaw.

The State was represented by Ernie

Jones, Deputy County Attorney.

The Court having heard the argument

of counsel and having read the brief of both parties grants the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
Prisoner

pursuant

that

to $76-5-102.5

the charge of Assault by a

Utah

Code Annotated

1953, as

amended is dismissed for the reason that the State failed to retain

VJ

•«• u

KJ

'\ ^

Order of Dismissal
CR 87-777
Page 2
any

video

tape

of

the

incident

at

the

Salt

Lake

County

Jail

involving the defendant
nt on March 13, p.987.
1987,
DATED this

£j

day of Juflubt,- 1987.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this StV day of August-; 1987, I
mailed

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal

to James Bradshaw, Attorney

for Defendant,

at

the

address

stated

below.

CW$ \ "fcrcre

Secretary \j
JAMES BRADSHAW
Attorney for the Defendant
Legal Defenders Association
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

cjb

/ * r > f \: ^ +

